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The Realities of Prisoners' Cases Under 42 U.S.C. §1983:
A Statistical Survey In The Northern District of Illinois
WILLIAM S. BAILEY*
INTRODUCTION
Although a variety of rights and privileges are traditionally lost
upon incarceration,' the unconscionable conditions in our nation's
prisons go far beyond the scope of any necessary deprivations.2 In
spite of recent media exposure to the aftermath of the uprising at Attica
State Prison, the general public remains largely uninformed and
disinterested in the real problems involved in the control and rehabili-
tation of criminal offenders. Legislative guidelines on correction policy
and decision-making are either non-existent, s or so vague as to be
functionally non-existent.4 Consequently, correctional officials have
* Staff Counsel, Governor's Commission for Revision of The Mental Health Code
of Illinois. B.A., University of Oregon, 1970; J.D., Northwestern University School of
Law, 1974. The initial work on this article was done under the supervision of Profes-
sor Norman M. Garland of the Northwestern University School of Law.
The substantial contribution of Ms. Sara Jo Wiedemann, a senior law student at Loy-
ola University School of Law, is gratefully acknowledged. Ms. Wiedemann provided in-
valuable assistance toward the completion of this article, sharing the responsibility for
collection of the data and updating the text in the due process and eighth amendment
sections.
The author also wishes to thank Mr. H.R. Cheng, Deputy Clerk in charge of prisoner
correspondence for the Northern District of Illinois for his invaluable assistance in re-
viewing court records.
1. See, e.g., Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948). See also Comment, The
Right of Expression In Prison, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 407, 410-12 (1967).
2. Chief Justice Burger has described prison systems as "the most neglected, the
most crucial and probably the least understood phase of the administration of justice,"
wherein inmates are treated like "rubbish." Address by Chief Justice Burger, Centennial
Convention of The Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Feb. 17, 1970, in 25
RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 14, 15 (Supp. March 1970).
3. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONs 84 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK
FORCE]. "Present legislation may set certain outside limits .... But it does not gen-
erally provide guidelines for the exercise of the vast discretion which remains, or indicate
the procedures by which important decisions should be made." Id.
4. Id.:
Enormous discretion is left to correctional administrators to define the condi-
tions of imprisonment. They determine the way in which the offender will
live for the term of imprisonment; how he is fed and clothed; whether he sleeps
527
Loyola University Law Journal
retained extraordinary discretion and almost total control over every
aspect of the prisoner's life. Yet, it is fundamentally "inconsistent with
our whole system of government to grant totally uncontrolled power
over the life of any person to any public official."5  In growing num-
bers, prisoners have turned to the federal courts in an effort to receive
fair treatment and protection of their constitutional rights against this
uncontrolled exercise of discretion and power. Encouraged by the Su-
preme Court decisions in Monroe v. Pape6 and Cooper v. Pate,7 these
claims of prison litigants have more and more frequently invoked the
civil rights protection of section 19838 as a basis for federal interven-
tion.
The increase in the number of prisoners' section 1983 cases filed
over the past 10 years has been explosive. By 1971, The Annual Re-
ports of the Administrative Office of The United States Courts had
observed a fundamental change in the character of prisoner com-
plaints, noting that habeas corpus type suits against law enforcement
officials or judicial procedures were in a state of decline. Instead, pris-
oners now seek the forum of the federal courts "to attack as a civil
rights violation the organized regimen of prison life which ....
strongly control[s] liberties taken for granted by the general public."9
The current report of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts shows that 16,267 prisoner petitions were filed in the federal
courts in 1972. Of these, 5,346 were actions under section 1983.10
A host -of practical problems has simultaneously arisen. The cor-
rectional system of the United States is a fragmented and diverse
in a cell or in a dormitory; whether he spends his days locked up or in rela-
tive freedom; what opportunity he has for work, education, or recreation.
They regulate his access to the outside world by defining mailing and visiting
privileges. They define rules of conduct and the penalties for violation of such
rules.
See also Hirschkop and Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L
REv. 795 (1969).
5. Goldsby v. Carnes, 365 F. Supp. 395, 399 (W.D, Mo. 1973).
6. 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (Illegal search and seizure held to state cause of action
for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
7. 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (cause of action under section 1983 for denial of prisoner's
right to purchase religious publications and other prison privileges).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citi-
zen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and Laws shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
9. 1972 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES CouRTs 116 [hereinafter cited as ANNuAL REPORT].
10. Id.
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group of virtually autonomous prisons, reform schools, county jails
and other detention facilities. Without expressly articulated standards
from the Supreme Court," the lower federal courts throughout -the
United States have borne the responsibility for developing standards
for constitutional review of prisoner claims. Many federal judges feel
that Monroe v. Pape, the first case to recognize a federal cause of ac-
tion, must be narrowly construed to limit federal civil rights jurisdic-
tion to manageable proportions. Thus, this lower court control of section
1983 has been marked by an "uncoordinated reaching for new sub-
stantive limits to justify dismissal of some actions .. .with resultant
divergences of principle."' 2 The section 1983 remedy has consequently
assumed a quixotic character and there has been a good deal of
confusion as to exactly how and when it applies. Chief Justice Warren
Burger expressed his concern about the rising tide of prisoner peti-
tions in his 1973 Report on the Federal Judicial Branch." He pro-
posed that such cases be moved out of the federal courts altogether. 4
The purpose of this article is to examine how prisoner section 1983
claims are treated, on a day to day basis, in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. To this end, all of the avail-
able prisoner section 1983 cases filed in the Northern District of Illi-
nois Eastern Division in the years 1971 and 1973 have been re-
viewed. 15 This material provides the data base for an analysis of the
following issues: the veracity of the burden on the courts argument;
the variations in the level of consideration given to different categories
11. One recent exception is mail censorship. In Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396, 407-14 (1974), the Supreme Court formulated a standard for review of constitu-
tional challenges to censorship of prisoner mail.
12. Note, Limiting The Section 1983 Action In The Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82
HARv. L. REV. 1486, 1494 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Limiting Monroe].
13. Burger, Report on The Federal Judicial Branch-1973, 59 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1128
(1973).
14. Let me suggest just a few alternatives that we could consider with profit:
1. Create a statutory administrative procedure for federal prisons to provide
for hearing prisoner complaints administratively within the prison and require
that these procedures be exhausted before any proceeding could be filed in fed-
eral courts. I believe many states would follow the federal example.
2. Establish informal grievance procedures in the state systems to hear pris-
oner complaints as a good many enlightened prison administrators have long
since done. The American Bar Association commission dealing with correc-
tional problems continues its important work, and I commend the subject of
prisoner grievances to its attention.
3. Federal judges, acting within their existing authority, should consider re-
ferring habeas corpus and civil rights cases brought by prisoners for prelimi-
nary consideration by a United States magistrate sitting as a special master and
reporting to the court.
Id.
The problem and possible solutions are also discussed in Justice Powell's opinion in
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 & n.9.
15. See Tables 1 through 10, Appendix A infra.
1975
Loyola University Law Journal
of prisoner section 1983 claims; the frequency with which particular
claims are litigated; variations in the attitudes of district judges to-
ward prisoner claims; and the probabilities of succes for different
claims. It is hoped that this article will provide a data base for im-
provements in the judicial administration of section 1983. As the dis-
trict court in Goldsby v. Carnes16 recognized, "prisoner cases are not
going to go away. . . they are destined to continue to increase in vol-
ume until .. .correctional institutions recognize that federally pro-
tected constitutional rights may not be ignored."'17
RESEARCH METHODS
Prisoners filed 218 civil rights complaints in the Northern District
of Illinois, Eastern Division in 1971;1s 192 were filed in 1973.19 They
were examined for the claims alleged, defenses raised, pleadings re-
quired, decisions reached and the time taken for disposition. The dep-
uty clerk in charge of prisoner correspondence keeps a record of pro
se civil rights complaints, and this record was the source of the cases
that were examined. The author relied on the clerk's decision as to
which cases were section 1983 and which were habeas corpus.
Procedure In The Northern District
When a pro se complaint is received by mail from a prisoner in the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, it is examined by the
deputy clerk in charge of prisoner correspondence. The clerk exam-
ines the complaint for compliance with required formalities and can
return it to the prisoner if it does not comply. The clerk does not ex-
amine the merits of the case. No record is kept of the number of cases
returned to prisoners but the current clerk claims that the number of
such rejections is minimal. A similar screening function is performed
by clerks who examine cases personally filed.
In every case considered, the prisoner filed in forma pauperis. Af-
ter the clerk accepts and dockets the case, it is taken before an emer-
gency judge for ruling on leave to file in forma pauperis. After leave
to file in forma pauperis is granted, the case is assigned to a judge and
proceeds in a normal fashion.
16. 365 F. Supp. 395 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
17. Id. at 397.
18. Table 1 infra.
19. Id.
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JUDICIAL DISPOSITION OF SECTION 1983 CASES
Judicial disposition of the section 1983 claims filed by prisoners
during 1971 was characterized by wholesale dismissals. Of the 218
cases filed in 1971, the court assumed jurisdiction over only 22 or 10
percent, and held a hearing in seven of these, or 3.2 percent of the total
cases filed. 0 Judicial relief and a favorable decision on the merits for
the inmate emerged in only four cases out of 218,21 leading to the con-
clusion that despite the frequently expressed fear that section 1983
actions pose a threat to state and local control of state and local penal
institutions,22 the remedy of federal intervention has proved largely il-
lusory. Even in those 22 cases which the court did not summarily dis-
miss, there was little effort to bring all of the facts before the court.
Although the state was required to file a responsive pleading in all
these cases, the resulting motions to dismiss usually contained little
more than "hands off" boiler plate language, stating that the federal
courts should not interfere in the administration of state prisons. Oc-
casionally, there were affidavits or other documents from prison offi-
cials concerning the factual matters in issue, such as prison menus
when an inadequate diet was alleged, or a copy of an inmate's discipli-
nary record when due process claims were involved. Yet, the usual
state response rarely contained a detailed presentation of the factual
situation involved, and most frequently relied on case law favorable to
dismissal. Although discovery was granted in 45 percent of these 22
cases, 21 the court often had nothing to consider in the non-discovery
cases except the often vague and rambling complaints of the inmate
and blanket assertions of non-interference from the state.
Despite the court's determination that these 22 cases presented seri-
ous issues of law and fact, counsel was not appointed for many of the
prisoners" and over half of these claims never developed into adver-
sary trials on the merits. Given this relatively casual attitude by
20. Table 3 infra.
21. Armstrong v. Bensinger, Civil No. 71 C 2144 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (limited injunc-
tive relief requiring due process notice and hearing prior to placement in disciplinary
confinement); Larson v. Moore, Civil No. 71 C 533 (N.D. Ill. 1973) ($500 in damages
for physical injuries after beating by prison guards); Bell v. Twomey, Civil No. 71 C
2296 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (same relief as in Armstrong v. Bensinger); Walker v. Ollis, Civil
No. 71 C 11 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (partial summary judgment protecting against further in-
terference with the mail by prison officials).
22. E.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974).
23. Table 3 infra.
24. See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois Department of Corrections, Civil No. 71 C 2170 (N.D.
Ill. 1973); Meeks v. Twomey, Civil No. 71 C 1921 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Ratliff v. Scott,
Civil No. 71 C 1523 (N.D. I1. 1972); Brown v. Twomey, Civil No. 71 C 1321 (N.D.
III. 1971).
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the court in these cases, it is not surprising that damages were granted
in only one case in 1971 and limited orders in two other cases.2"
Analysis of the subject matter of eight cases given careful review in
full trials in 1971 indicates a pattern of judicial intervention only in
cases of outrageous violations of constitutional rights. Four of the ten
cases in which discovery was granted, depositions taken and counsel
appointed in a full adversary context, involved allegations of physical
beatings administered by prison guards or other inmates and serious
injury to the plaintiff.2" The special attention given to most physical
brutality cases is indicated by the greater number of days required to
reach a decision in them-nearly double that of the average for all
section 1983 cases in 1971.27
A full hearing was also granted in five consolidated cases filed by
the same inmate in 1971 alleging a deprivation of first amendment
rights.28 Specifically, these cases were primarily concerned with access
to the courts and the right to receive periodicals and other literature.
The priority status given first amendment claims is indicated by the
time spent on them. First amendment mail and communication cases
absorbed twice as much time as the average for all section 1983
cases.
29
The most significant prisoner victory of the section 1983 cases filed
in 1971 occurred in the court of appeals. The Seventh Circuit vacated
the district court decision in Armstrong v. Bensinger ° and provided
greater due process protection for inmates transferred to the punitive
Special Program Unit at Stateville penitentiary. The case was a class
action involving administrative punishments in solitary confinement
following a near riot. A full hearing was granted by the district court
but this seems to have been the result of unilateral intervention by the
ACLU and the convenience of dealing with the large number of in-
mates with similar claims in one action. As a general matter, section
1983 cases brought by state prisoners received more careful consider-
25. See note 21 supra.
26. See, e.g., Butcher v. Moore, Civil No. 71 C 823 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Larson v.
Moore, Civil No. 71 C 533 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Brown v. Twomey, Civil No. 71 C 1321
(N.D. I11. 1971).
27. Table 2 infra.
28. See, e.g., Walker v. Ollis, Civil Nos. 71 C 11 and 71 C 1381 (N.D. Ill. 1973);
Walker v. Myers, Civil No. 71 C 1972 (N.D. IIL. 1971); Walker v. Bensinger, Civil No.
71 C 2503 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Walker v. Twomey, Civil No. 71 C 2518 (N.D. Ill. 1973);
Jenkins v. Meyers, Civil No. 71 C 825, reported at 338 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Il. 1972).
29. Table 2 infra.
30. Civil No. 71 C 2144 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
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ation whenever counsel entered the picture, whether appointed by the
court or not. a'
The cases in 1971 indicate a very cautious extension of section
1983 jurisdiction to state prisoners. Federal intervention was limited
to gross invasions of constitutional rights involving either physical
brutality or infringement of certain high priority first amendment
rights. Except for the possibility that the threat of federal intervention
caused state officials to voluntarily provide the relief requested,32 the
federal forum had no particular advantage over its state counterpart
for the prisoner-plaintiff alleging any other deprivation.
While it does appear that many of the complaints filed in 1971
were frivolous, a significant number made sufficient allegations to sur-
vive motions to dismiss,"3 particularly in light of the United States Su-
preme Court ruling in Haines v. Kerner34 that district courts must con-
sider the allegations of a prisoner's pro se complaints under less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Under
Haines, a federal court can dismiss prisoner complaints without a
hearing only where it is "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to re-
lief." The district court's dismissal in Haines was held to be error be-
cause it was based on an assumption that federal courts could inquire
into the internal operations of state penitentiaries only under excep-
tional circumstances. Yet, during 1971, 89.9 percent of the section
1983 cases filed in the Northern District of Illinois were summarily
dismissed and 56.4 percent of the dismissals were for failure to state a
claim."6 Only two cases filed in 1971 decided subsequent to Haines v.
31. See, e.g., Butcher v. Moore, Civil No. 71 C 822 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Walker v.
Ollis, Civil No. 71 C 11 and 71 C 13,81 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Keating v. Barnes, Civil No.
71 C 1424 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
32. See, e.g., Chicago Connections v. Bensinger, Civil No. 71 C 2382 (N.D. Ill.
1972); Walker v. Ollis, Civil Nos. 71 C 11 and 71 C 1381 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Walker
v. Myers, Civil No. 71 C 1972 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Walker v. Bensinger, Civil No. 2503
(N.D. I11. 1971); Roebuck v. Ill. Dept. of Corrections, Civil No. 71 C 349 (N.D. Ill.
1971).
33. See, e.g., DeMary v. Bensinger, Civil No. 71 C 220 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (inmate
with tuberculosis and diabetes allegedly given improper diet); Ponder v. Ogilvie, Civil
No. 71 C 1239 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (inmate's eyesight and physical health allegedly affected
by placement in segregation unit); Burks v. Barnes, Civil No. 71 C 1172 (N.D. Ill.
1971) (alleged administration of punitive medication); United States ex rel. Smith v.
Shimp, Civil No. 71 C 2062 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (alleged serious beatings by guards with
blackjacks).
34. 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
35. Id. at 521 (citations omitted). See also Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 547(1964): "Taking as true the allegations of the complaint, as they must be on a motion
to dismiss, the complaint stated a cause of action and it was error to dismiss it. Dio-
guardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944)."
36. Table 3 inf ra.
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Kerner mentioned it and assumed jurisdiction on the authority of its
holding.
Although Monroe v. Pape7 made it expressly clear that section
1983 jurisdiction was not dependent upon exhaustion of state reme-
dies, 4.5 percent of the 1971 and 5.7 percent of the 1973 cases were
dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. 8 Five of these in-
volved the kind of classic habeas type challenges to an original convic-
tion that is properly dismissable for failure to exhaust state reme-
dies."9 However, five others came within well recognized areas of
section 1983 jurisdiction for which dismissal for failure to exhaust state
remedies is inappropriate.40
The total number of cases filed in 1973 and their basic distribution
according to the types of claims alleged is remarkably similar to 1971,
particularly with regard to due process and prison conditions issues.
Differences between the samples include a greater number of mail-
communication and deprivation of property suits filed in 1973 cou-
pled with fewer non-prison and parole cases for that year. However,
the statistics for the 1973 sample reveal a fundamental departure
from the summary dismissal so prevalent in 1971.
The average prisoner section 1983 case filed in 1973 took over 70
percent more court days to reach a decision than its 1971 counter-
part," even though the total number of civil cases filed in the North-
ern District of Illinois remained stable over this period. 42  While over a
third of the inmates' pleadings were dismissed in 1971 without a re-
sponse from the state, only 11.8 percent of the 1973 sample was dis-
posed of in this manner. 43 A significantly greater number of the cases
37. 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
38. Tables 3 and 4 infra. See, e.g., Cassman v. Siete, Civil No. 73 C 824 (N.D.
Ill. 1973) (claimed illegal search and seizure which resulted in conviction); Smith v.
People of Illinois, Civil No. 73 C 1651 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (alleged that rape conviction
was obtained in violation of constitutional rights); United States ex rel. Stanton v. Ben-
singer, Civil No. 73 C 34 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (claimed error in time credited for state sen-
tences served and state appeal handled inadequately).
39. For examples of cases where dismissal for failure to exhaust was proper, see, e.g.,
May v. People, Civil No. 71 C 1368 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Webb v. Twomey, Civil No. 71
C 2137 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Stone v. Morris, Civil No. 71 C 83 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Hamby
v. Bensinger, Civil No. 71 C 1094 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
40. Inappropriate dismissals for failure to exhaust state remedies include: Slaughter
v. Illinois Department of Corrections, Civil No. 71 C 89 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (holding that
complaint of improper confinement in segregation unit and monitoring of conversations
by prison officials must first be resolved through the administrative process); Meeks v.
Twomey, Civil No. 1921 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (false imprisonment); Sullivan v. Bensinger,
Civil No. 71 C 2724 (N.D. 111. 1971) (prison discipline without due process).
41. Table 2 infra.
42. A total of 3,153 civil cases were filed in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division in 1971 and 3,259 in 1973.
43. Table 5 infra.
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in 1973 were held to be proper subjects for court consideration under
section 1983. Out of 173 cases studied for 1973, a motion to dismiss
was initially denied in 36 cases, or over 20 percent of the total." Only
10 percent of the 1971 cases had advanced to this stage of the pro-
ceedings.
Further, of these 36 meritorious cases in 1973, 22 advanced to the
hearing stage, accounting for 61.1 percent of this category. In 1971,
just eight cases out of the 22 in which jurisdiction was granted received
any kind of a hearing.
Since over 40 percent of these meritorious 1973 cases are still
pending, a comparison of the relief granted is not meaningful. How-
ever, it is apparent that fewer section 1983 cases are not subjected to
summary dismissal. The greater participation of counsel in the cases
in 1973 gives this more careful consideration by the court added sig-
nificance. As in 1971, cases in which the inmate was represented by
counsel took more court days to decide and were more likely to go
through discovery and hearing procedures, receiving a thorough ex-
ploration of the factual issues involved.45 In many cases granted juris-
diction in 1973, the inmate had successfully found legal representa-
tion on his own prior to filing, and appointment of counsel by the
court was unnecessary.
However, the expanded number of cases granted jurisdiction in
1973 did not extend beyond the same narrow subject matter limits
which characterized the cases in 1971. In 1973, the type of section
1983 cases which consistently received a hearing after the appoint-
ment of counsel and discovery were those alleging beatings by prison
guards or other use of extreme physical force. 6 Of the 20 cases alleg-
ing brutality by prison guards, nine were seriously considered and took
an average of nearly a year to decide. The greater number of such
brutality cases filed in 1973 constitutes an important departure from
the 1971 sample, further exaggerated by the great frequency of sum-
mary dismissals for similar cases in 1971. Mail-communication cases
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Wright v. Twomey, Civil No. 73 C 68 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Bach v. Sielaff,
Civil No. 73 C 2273 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Hexum v. Bensinger, Civil No. 73 C 86 (N.D.
I1. 1973); Stone v. Morris, Civil No. 73 C 329 (N.D. Ill. 1973). For comparison to
cases granting jurisdiction where counsel was not appointed, see, e.g., Marshall v. Ben-
singer, Civil No. 73 C 1616 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Wilhemi v. Crabtree, Civil No. 73 C 2962
(N.D. IH. 1973). Both cases were dismissed for the failure of the unassisted pris-
oner-plaintiff to respond.
46. See, e.g., Sims v. Ford, Civil No. 73 C 986 (N.D. I1. 1973); Henderson v.
Elrod, Civil No. 73 C 2932 (N.D. IIl. 1973); Hexum v. Bensinger, Civil No. 73 C 86
(N.D. M11. 1973); Stone v. Morris, Civil No. 73 C 329 (N.D. 111. 1973).
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continued to receive priority attention in 1973 and again took among
the greatest number of court days to decide.4 7
A greater number of due process claims were seriously considered
in 1973, probably as a result of the uncertainty about the due process
requirements to be applied in prison disciplinary hearings pending the
Seventh Circuit's decision in United States ex rel Miller v. Twomey. 4s
Sixteen of the 36 cases held to be justiciable in 1973 involved due
process issues, and most of these involved procedures followed in the
imposition of punitive segregation.
Overall, the disposition of section 1983 cases filed during 1973 was
marked by more careful and thorough review, with fewer summary
dismissals and more discovery and hearing activity than in 1971.
ALLEGATION OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
The most common prisoner section 1983 complaint alleges viola-
tion of the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. The claims allege violation in the form of physical bru-
tality, inadequate medical care and improper administration of prison
discipline. In the Northern District of Illinois cases reviewed, the most
frequent allegation of cruel and unusual punishment involved cell
conditions while in solitary or other special disciplinary confinement.
In 1971, 75 cases or 38 percent of the sample, contained claims that
the prisoner was taken out of the general inmate population for disci-
plinary reasons and subjected to a filthy environment with impure
foods and/or inadequate bedding, personal sanitation, fresh air or exer-
cise. Similar claims constituted 44 percent of the cases in 1973."9
Only one of the claims in 1971 received a full trial on the merits and,
as to the eighth amendment issue, sustained the view that punishment
is cruel and unusual only when it is "so foul, so inhuman and so viola-
tive of the basic concepts of decency" 50 as to shock the collective con-
science of our society.
47. See, e.g., Wilde v. Menard, Civil No. 73 C 1119 (N.D. Ill. 1973); DeMars v.
Tyrell, Civil No. 726 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Crislip v. Twomey, Civil No. 73 C 33 (N.D.
Il1. 1973); Bach v. Sielaff, Civil No. 73 C 1345 (N.D. 11. 1973).
48. 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973). Armstrong v. Bensinger, Civil No. 71 C 2144
(N.D. Ill. 1972), filed in 1971, was consolidated with other cases in Miller and is still
pending upon remand, leaving some lingering confusion as to the present state of due
process law.
49. Table 2 infra.
50. United States ex rel. Miller v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 333 F. Supp. 1352,
1354 (N.D. IIl. 1971). While noting that judicial concepts of decency concerning prison
conditions may not have kept up with the moral standards of the time, Judge Marovitz
held that the federal courts could not intervene under the eighth amendment except
536
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Tne situation in 1973 had changed markedly and eighth amend-
ment cases constituted the largest subject matter category seriously
considered by the courts. Of the 36 cases in which jurisdiction was
granted, 21 set forth cruel and unusual punishment claims.51 The al-
leged denial of medical care" and brutality by prison guards53 ac-
counted for the majority of these 21 cases, several of which proceeded
to discovery and a hearing on the merits.54
Even in 1971, the eighth amendment claims received more serious
treatment than the average section 1983 petition. An analysis of the
number of pleadings filed in the 1971 cases reveals that significantly
fewer eighth amendment claims were dismissed on the basis of the
complaint alone. The plaintiffs submitted supplemental pleadings in
6.8 percent of the conditions cases and courts ordered a responsive
pleading in an additional 68 percent. The more thorough considera-
tion of eighth amendment cases is also evidenced by the greater num-
ber of days required to reach a decision-30 percent more than aver-
age in 1971 and 17 percent more time in 1973.6
Although many of the conditions cases deemed meritorious in
1973 are pending, judicial relief may be difficult to obtain. While the
district courts often agree that the alleged conditions would undoubt-
edly make confinement in such quarters unpleasant, they rarely con-
clude that such unpleasantness is sufficiently foul and inhuman as to
fall within the proscription of the eighth amendment. 7 Further, soli-
where conditions are foul, inhuman and violative of the basic concepts of decency (citing
Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967), and Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105
(7th Cir. 1971)). Although the court found conditions at Stateville prison "far from
ideal or tolerable" and did "not in any sense" condone them, it felt compelled to dismiss
the case under the prevailing shock the conscience test.
See also Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966); Wright v. McMann,
387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); and Bauer, J.'s memorandum opinion of June 13, 1972
in Amrstrong v. Bensinger, Civil No. 71 C 2144 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
51. Table 4 injra.
52. E.g., Wright v. Twomey, Civil No. 73 C 68 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
53. See, e.g., Sims v. Elrod, Civil No. 73 C 986 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (prisoner allegedly
beaten at Cook County Jail); Henderson v. Elrod, Civil No. 73 C 2932 (N.D. Il. 1973)
(prisoner allegedly beaten at Cook County Jail); Hexum v. Bensinger, Civil No. 73 C
86 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (alleged brutality by guards); Stone v. Morris, Civil No. 73 C 329
(N.D. Ill. 1973) (claimed was beaten and maced).
54. See cases in note 46 supra. See also Wright v. Twomey, Civil No. 73 C 68
(N.D. I11. 1973).
55. Table 5 infra.
56. Table 2 infra.
57. "Shock the conscience" as a standard for determination of what constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment has been severely criticized. As the defendant's unsuccessful
attempt to justify "strip cells" as lawful punitive devices in Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F.
Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966), indicates, the good faith of the penal objectives behind the
use of punishment cannot be taken for granted. Insofar as it ignores the institutionaljustification for punishment, the "shock the conscience" standard is severely deficient
and ultimately discretionary. See also TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 83-85:
[c]orrectional administrators have been slow to develop policies and proce-
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tary confinement in and of itself has been held not to violate the cruel
and unusual punishment clause, and the alleged "temporary incon-
veniences and discomforts" incident thereto are not usually regarded
as a sufficient basis for judicial relief.58
Both as a theoretical matter of case law and actual practice, federal
courts limit their interference with prison conditions to situations
where state officials "have abandoned elemental concepts of decency
by permitting conditions to prevail of a shocking and debased na-
ture." 59 The uniform dismissal of the conditions cases in the 1971
sample indicates that although the application of the eight amend-
ment to the states technically includes state prisoner claims,"° few
prisoners have won concrete relief through section 1983 petitions.
MEDICAL CARE CLAIMS
Of the total 1971 sample, 19 cases, or 9.8 percent alleged either a
total denial of medical care, or negligence in its administration.61 Yet,
only one of these 19 petitioners was successful in securing a hearing
on the merits.6 2 The major statistical difference between medical care
cases and most others in 1971 was the greater number of days re-
quired to reach a decision. However, the absence of any affirmative
relief in 1971 made this greater hesitancy to summarily dismiss medi-
cal cases virtually meaningless.
There were 30 medical care claims in the 1973 sample.63 Jurisdic-
dures to guide correctional officials and protect the rights of offenders [and
there is] strong resistance to the introduction of increased legal controls in
the correctional area.
Alternative standards have been proposed. See. e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 676 (1962) (concurring opinion of Douglas, J.); Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S.
889, 890-91 (1963) (dissenting opinion of Goldberg, J.). Under these alternatives, pun-
ishment would be judged cruel and unusual to the extent that it was disproportionate
to the offense for which it is imposed or went beyond what is necessary to achieve legiti-
mate state purposes. Because these alternatives involve considerations of why the punish-
ment was administered, their adoption would all but preclude summary dismissal of
eighth amendment claims.
58. Placement in the usual solitary confinement situation marked by unpleasantness
only and not shocking deprivations, does not state a cause of action in most circuits.
See Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (Sth Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Knight v.
Ragen, 337 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 985 (1965); Pinkston v.
Bensinger, 359 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
59. Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 680 (N.D. Cal. 1966). See also Wright
v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir.
1968); Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
60. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
61. Table 2 infra.
62. Lewis v. Illinois Department of Corrections, Civil No. 71 C 450 (N.D. Ill.
1971).
63. Table 2 infra.
1975 Prisoner's Cases
tion was granted in six of these 30 cases and one of these resulted in af-
firmative relief.64
The infrequency of affirmative relief is a function of the strict stand-
ard of liability applied by most federal courts in medical care cases.
Federal courts have consistently held that negligent or inadequate
treatment claims are actionable under section 1983 only when negli-
gence or deprivation of care reaches a level at which it so shocks the
conscience of the court as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the eighth amendment.6 5  This standard frequently re-
quires a finding of willfulness,6 6 despite express language in Monroe
v. Pape67 excluding specific intent as a consideration in section 1983
cases. As with other eighth amendment claims, the standard of liability
applied to medical care cases precludes affirmative relief in most
cases even if the courts were to give full and serious consideration to
prisoner allegations.
DUE PROCESS IN DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
After eighth amendment claims, the next most frequent allegation
found in section 1983 petitions is violation of due process in discipli-
nary proceedings. These due process claims, although often combined
64. Wright v. Twomey, Civil No. 73 C 68 (N.D. I1L 1973). Soon after an operation
in which 65 percent of his intestine was removed, the petitioner was involved in an alter-
cation and placed in disciplinary isolation. His prescribed post-operative meal plan was
ignored and a shocked court granted $500 in damages.
65. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Sigler, 320 F. Supp. 690, aII'd, 445 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1970)(proper standard of adequate medical care had not been accorded inmate whose past
medical history included possibility of cancer).
See also Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970); Mayfield v. Craven, 433
F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1970); Robinson v. Jordan, 355 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Tex. 1973);
Hopkins v. County of Cook, 305 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. l1. 1969) (insufficient diagnosis
resulting in death did not state a claim under section 1983).
But see Rimka v. Fayette County Board of Com'rs, 360 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D. Ky.
1973); Ramsey v. Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
Even though injury to the prisoner results, harm from merely negligent or inadequate
medical treatment equivalent to malpractice is not actionable under section 1983.
Wood v. Maryland Casualty Company, 322 F. Supp. 436 (W.D. La. 1971); Church
v. Hegstrom, 416 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1969); Fear v. Commonwealth, 413 F.2d 88 (3d
Cir. 1969); Coleman v. Johnson, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957). Claims of inadequate
treatment are often construed as merely differences of opinion between the prisoner and
the medical authorities of the penal institution. Mayfield v. Craven, 433 F.2d 873 (9th
Cir. 1970); Coppinger v. Townsend, 398 F.2d 392 (10th Cir. 1968). The denial must
be a total one of necessary rather than requested medical treatment to be considered a
violation of federally protected rights. Coppinger v. Townsend, 398 F.2d 392, 394 (10th
Cir. 1968): "A claim of total denial of medical care differs from a claim of inadequacy
of medical care .... The prisoner's right is to medical care-not to the type or scope
of medical care which he personally desires."
66. E.g., Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir. 1970); Martinez v. Mancusi,
443 F.2d 921, 924 (2d Cir. 1971); Robinson v. Jordan, 355 F. Supp. 1228, 1230 (N.D.
Tex. 1973). But see Church v. Hegstrom, 416 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1969).
67. 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). Previously, intent had been required under section
1983. See Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959).
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with allegations that the discipline imposed is cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, are concerned with the method by which the prisoners are
placed in disciplinary confinement, denied "good time," or lose other
prison privileges.
Prior to the last decade, there were virtually no circumstances un-
der which a federal court would intervene in matters of prison disci-
pline and administrators were vested by judicial default with the
greatest degree of uncontrolled power over the liberty of human
beings that one can find in our legal system.68 But as federal court en-
forcement of due process rights has expanded to cover a wider and
wider variety of state administrative settings, there has been a growing
recognition that although wide discretion is still allowed prison offi-
cials in maintaining order and discipline, the courts have a duty to as-
sure that conditions do not overstep the bounds of federal constitu-
tional protections. Under the emerging rule, prison regulations must
bear a reasonable relation to valid prison goals, and rules which in-
fringe upon particularly important rights will require proportionately
stronger justification. 9 The court must balance the asserted need for
the regulation in furthering prison security or orderly administration
against the claimed constitutional right and the degree to which it has
been impaired. Under this test, safeguards were extended by lower
courts to prison disciplinary proceedures70 and by the Supreme Court
to parole revocation proceedings. 71 However, in 1974, the Supreme
Court made it clear in Wolff v. McDonnell 72 that it would not require
all of the due process protections for prison disciplinary hearings that
it had required for parole revocation. Wolff requires: (1) written no-
tice to the prisoner of the charges against him at least 24 hours prior
to the hearing; (2) a written statement of evidence relied on and rea-
sons for the disciplinary procedures; (3) a written record of the pro-
ceedings; and (4) that the inmate be allowed to call witnesses and
present documentary evidence at the discretion of the hearing com-
68. See Comment, Beyond The Ken Of The Courts: A Critique Of Judicial Refusal
To Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963); Goldfarb and Singer,
Redressing Prisoners' Grievances. 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175, 181-84 (1970).
69. See, e.g., Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Payne
v. Whitmore, 325 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Cal. 1971); United States ex rel. Raymond v.
Rundle, 276 F. Supp. 637 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Rocha v. Beto, 449 F.2d 741 (5th Cir.
1971).
70. See, e.g., Sostro v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 198 (2d Cir. 1971) (substantial dep-
.ivations require a hearing including the right to confront accusers, to be informed of
evidence against him and a reasonable opportunity to explain his actions).
71. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
72. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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mittee. Wolff held that neither the right to confront and cross-examine
accusers nor the right to counsel were constitutionally mandated in
disciplinary hearings. 73
Judicial disposition of due process claims in our 1971 and 1973 re-
view of section 1983 petitions does not, of course, reflect the 1974 Su-
preme Court decision in Wolff. During the period of the 1971 sam-
ple, the Seventh Circuit operated under a standard that required little
more than notice of the charges and an opportunity to speak in his
own defense.74 Given this limited due process requirement, it is not
surprising that 24.1 percent of the petitions filed during 1971 were
summarily dismissed75 and relief was granted only in Armstrong ".
Bensinger76 and three other cases with similar facts.77
During 1973, the Seventh Circuit reevaluated its due process stand-
ards for prison disciplinary hearings and held in United States ex rel
Miller v. Twomey 78 that due process does require impartiality of the
disciplinary committee as well as notice and an opportunity to speak
in one's own defense. The case apparently did have an effect on prison
administrative practices in Illinois. While there was no change be-
tween 1971 and 1973 in the number of inmates' claims alleging that
they had been placed in punitive segregation without due process,
fewer cases alleged a specific denial of notice and a hearing. These de-
velopments in the law also had a pronounced effect on the district
courts' treatment of due process cases. Whereas 5.7 percent of the due
process cases out of the 1971 sample were granted jurisdiction, the
number increased to nearly 10 percent in 1973. 79 Miller v. Twomev
was often mentioned as the basis of both jurisdiction and the ultimate
decision. The district court spent 56 percent more court days in 1973
in consideration of due process claims. s0 Only 3.5 percent of the 1973
73. Id. at 558-63.
74. Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971). Although United States ex rel.
Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 713 (7th Cir. 1973), did move beyond Adams v. Pate
in setting forth due process protections, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that "a myriad
of problems of prison administration must remain beyond the scope of proper judicial
concern."
75. Table 5 inf ra.
76. Civil No. 71 C 2144 (N.D. Ill. 1972). The case was a class action filed after
a fight between guards and prisoners at a Stateville baseball game led to lock-up and
segregation of prisoners arbitrarily selected as "agitators."
77. See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois Dept of Corrections, Civil No. 71 C 2170 (N.D. 111.
1971); Bell v. Twomey, Civil No. 71 C 2296 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
78. 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973).
79. Table 5 infra.
30. Table 2 infra.
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due process cases were dismissed on the basis of the complaint alone,
compared to 24.1 percent in 1971.81
With the establishment of a definite standard by which prison disci-
plinary actions are to be judged, the federal courts will undoubtedly
be called upon to monitor compliance by state officials. Given in-
mates' natural hostility toward their captors, which is frequently ex-
acerbated by prison officials' predominant concern with maintaining
order and discipline, due process claims under section 1983 are likely
to continue to be filed in large numbers. While Wolff has answered
some of the questions raised by these petitions, there is still, as the dis-
sent in Wolff points out, a great deal of unreviewable discretion left to
prison officials in the area of confrontation and cross-examination of
the inmate's accusers, and in the opportunity for the inmate to present
witnesses and evidence.82
FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS: MAIL AND COMMUNICATION
Of all of the subject areas of section 1983 petitions, the federal dis-
trict courts in the Northern District of Illinois have been most sympa-
thetic to the assertion of first amendment rights to communicate with
the outside world, particularly when this involves letters and papers
sent to and from courts.3 The mail communication cases filed in
1971 represent 14.5 percent of the entire sample and ten of the 22
cases in which jurisdiction was granted. Of the 1973 cases, 22.5
percent alleged mail-communication claims and these accounted for
14 of the 36 actions granted jurisdiction. 4 In both samples, courts
showed a much greater willingness to grant section 1983 jurisdiction
and to consider these cases on the merits. Of the mail cases, 35.6 per-
cent of those filed in 1971 and 35.9 percent of those filed in 1973
were seriously considered.8 5
Claims involving denial of access to the legal process were among
the most frequent in both samples and courts spent relatively more
time considering these than any other class of cases. Almost a third of
the 1973 cases still pending allege infringement of mail-communica-
tion rights so there is a substantial likelihood that at least some of
these cases will secure relief.8"
81. Table 5 infra.
82. 418 U.S. at 586 (1974).
83. See cases cite4 note 47 supra.
84. Table 2 infra.
85. Table 5 infra.
86. See, e.g., Crislip v. Twomey, Civil No. 73 C 33 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Hexum v.
Fogel, Civil No. 73 C 825 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
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As in due process actions, the substantive case law probably has a
direct influence on the manner in which mail cases were considered.
Since Ex parte Hull,87 in which the Supreme Court declared that prison
officials could not deny inmates access to the judicial process, the
courts have progressively expanded the right of access and invalidated
prison regulations unreasonably limiting the preparation of legal doc-
uments, the types of library material available, and the assistance of
jail-house lawyers.8" Constitutional guarantees are held to be control-
ling in the absence of a "clear and present danger of a breach of prison
security or discipline or some other substantial interference with the
orderly functioning of the institution."8 9 As a consequence, most
courts now find an almost absolute right for inmates to correspond
with the courts free of censorship. It is noteworthy that in these access
to the courts cases the state rarely tried to justify the alleged restric-
tion on the grounds that it was necessary for discipline or proper
prison administration but more often asserted that the deprivation
was an unintentional mistake.
Yet, as the statistics demonstrate, not all first amendment cases re-
ceive the same deferential consideration as those involving the right of
access to the courts, lawyers or legal materials. In cases involving the
more general mail-communication rights of prisoners, many courts
have been more than willing to sustain censorship practices of admin-
istrators as justifiable in light of state interests in discipline and or-
der.90 However, last year in Procunier v. Martinez,91 the Supreme
Court made it clear that censorship of prisoner mail is justified only
where it can be shown to be directly related to a substantial govern-
ment interest in security, order or rehabilitation and is not justified to
suppress criticism of prison conditions or expression of political or reli-
gious views." The rule of the Martinez case is destined to have a pro-
found effect on censorship practices in prisons and on the section
1983 mail censorship cases still pending in the Northern District.
PAROLE
Prisoners' section 1983 claims regarding the operations of the parole
87. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
88. See, e.g., Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (lst Cir. 1970); Hooks v. Kelley, 463
F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1972); Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966).
89. Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 822 (3d Cir. 1968).
90. See, e.g., Fussa v. Taylor, 168 F. Supp. 302, 303 (N.D. Pa. 1958); Nolan v. Fitz-
patrick, 451 F.2d 545, 549 (Ist Cir. 1971); Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1231 (4th
Cir. 1971); Evans v. Moseley, 455 F.2d 1084, 1087 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
889 (1972).
91. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
92. Id. at 404-414.
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system are among the least likely to be given serious considera-
tion. In the 1971 cases studied, parole claims accounted for 9.8 per-
cent of the total sample9 3 but were dismissed much more summarily
than most other categories, frequently on the basis of the complaint
alone. The case law of the Seventh Circuit has traditionally been neg-
ative toward parole claims under section 1983, whether for failure to
grant a parole, or for improper revocation.
Since Mempa v. Rhay94 and Morrissey v. Brewer95 guaranteed pro-
cedural due process in parole revocation proceedings, state compliance
with the requirements of these cases has reduced the number of sec-
tion 1983 complaints alleging improper revocation, and in the 1973
sample there were no petitions alleging improper revocation of parole.
However, with regard to the initial decision to grant parole, the Sev-
enth Circuit persists in the view that the prisoner is to serve out the
length of his term, and any reduction through parole is a non-enforce-
able matter of grace.9 6 Memorandum opinions dismissing cases chal-
lenging refusals to grant parole in both samples usually cited opinions
holding that the parole board's power is entirely discretionary and a
decision adverse to the petitioner is not subject to judicial review.
The 1973 sample contained markedly fewer parole cases than
1971, amounting to only 2.3 percent of the 1973 total.9 7 Although re-
sponsive pleadings were filed by the state in all of these cases, they
were disposed of in less time than all other categories except one. The
precise reason for the decline in parole cases is not clear. The advent
of parole regulation in the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections,9" ef-
fective in 1973, may have caused parole decisions to be made on a
more orderly basis. It also may be that the consistent unwillingness of
the courts to consider denials of parole has discouraged inmates from
filing these claims. Unless or until the Morrissey principle is extended
to the parole decision, these claims are doomed to summary dismissal.
BURDEN ON THE COURTS
A careful study of the characteristics of our section 1983 samples
casts considerable doubt on the proposition that these petitions are an
93. Table 2 infra.
94. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
95. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
96. United States ex rel. Campbell v. Pate, 401 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1968). See also
United States ex rel. Foley v. Ragen, 143 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1944).
97. Table 2 infra.
98. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1003-3-1 to 1003-3-13 (1973).
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unreasonable burden on the courts. Although the Northern District of
Illinois, with its large state prison at Joliet, has long been noted as a
concentrated area of prison litigation, only 6.8 percent of the total
number of civil actions filed in 1971 and 5.9 percent of those filed in
1973 were initially designated prisoner section 1983 claims. With 170
habeas corpus petitions filed in 1971 and 117 in 1973, the respective
shares of prisoner claims on each docket increased to 12.1 percent
and 9.4 percent.9"
But it is a distortion to give these percentages the same weight as
other civil cases. Even though the section 1983 cases filed in 1973
were considered more carefully, for many judges the disposition of
prisoner complaints is still an administrative bookkeeping matter.
This attitude is demonstrated most clearly in the 1971 sample. An as-
toundingly large number of cases, amounting to a third of the 1971
sample, were decided on the basis of the inmates' pleadings alone,
usually a few days after their receipt by the court. The courts often did
no more than fill out a minute order dismissing the petitions for fail-
ure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Since adversary
pleadings were required in just 63.3 percent of the cases, it is clear
that many of the 1971 cases were on the docket as a matter of form
only.
Few of the 1971 cases in which a motion to dismiss was filed sur-
vived beyond this stage of the pleadings, and most were dismissed for
failure to state a claim. Only eight cases out of the total filed in 1971
received anything more than an ex parte hearing. These eight cases
and two others got to the discovery stage. Thus, only 4.5 percent of
the section 1983 petitions filed by prisoners involved the kind of ad-
ministrative burdens normally associated with full judicial action.
The average number of days taken to reach a decision for 1971
cases was 104.6 days,100 a figure suggesting more than summary
treatment. But the time was largely consumed by administrative com-
plications within the court, such as assignment to another judge, delay
in receiving a responsive pleading from the state or a judge allowing a
case to lay untouched due to other priorities. Rarely did any prisoner
case exceed one page of docket entries and most were limited to ac-
knowledgment of filing the complaint, service of process and dismis-
sal. The 1971 cases that actually received a hearing in court constituted
only 0.25 percent of the total docket of the district court.
99. Table I inf ra.
100. Table 2 infra.
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Almost one-third of the section 1983 petitions filed were unrelated
to conditions of imprisonment and constituted the kinds of challenges
to the petitioners' original convictions that are more appropriately
found in habeas corpus petitions and resolved under the state post-
conviction act.' Since these cases were often full of garbled allega-
tions of constitutional violation with little legal merit it is not surpris-
ing that the district judges frequently dismissed them summarily. Far
fewer court days than average were spent on the disposition of these
cases in both samples-38.0 percent of them were dismissed on the
complaint alone in 1971 and 22.1 percent in 1973. Since these cases
would have been summarily dismissed in the same fashion under ha-
beas corpus statutes, they place an added burden on the courts only to
the extent that prisoners are bringing their complaints under both
habeas corpus and section 1983. However, (a study of both samples
shows that such abuse is not prevalent. Habeas corpus type cases filed
under section 1983 are rarely re-litigated. Habeas corpus actions them-
selves have steadily declined in number.
An argument might have been made that section 1983 petitions
represent a nuisance to the courts at the appeal stage, since 18.3 per-
cent of the inmates in 1971 were not satisfied with their initial rejec-
tion and sought further relief from the Seventh Circuit.1 2 The dissat-
isfaction with district court decisions probably reflected the summary
treatment given to many of the petitions. Many orders or opinions did
not expressly set forth the reasons for denying jurisdiction. As more
thorough consideration was given to petitions at the initial decision
stages, the number of appeals markedly declined. The 1973 sample
indicates that there is no critical danger of an extraordinary burden
being placed on the court of appeals.
The court of appeals has played a very active role in the handling of
section 1983 cases in the circuit. In the 1971 sample, 60.6 percent of
the petitioners who were denied leave to appeal by the district courts
contested the denial and 41.2 percent of them were vindicated by the
court of appeals. 10
101. See, e.g., Cansler v. Wilson, Civil No. 71 C 1096 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Medrano
v. Woodward, Civil No. 73 C 1733 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Smalley v. Carr, Civil No. 73 C
1332 (N.D. Il. 1973); Fannelli v. United States, Civil No. 71 C 377 (N.D. Ill.
1971); Cassman v. Siete, Civil No. 73 C 824 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Eastland v. Van
Deusen, Civil No. 71 C 957 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Lambert v. Carlson, Civil No. 71 C 9.52(N.D. Il. 1971); United States ex rel. Dellahoussaye v. People of Illinois, Civil No.
71 C 1779 (N.D. Il. 1971); Gross v. Power, Civil No. 71 C 945 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
102. Table 9 infra.
103. Table 10 infra.
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The 19 cases before the Seventh Circuit on certification by the dis-
trict court or the court of appeals represented 8.7 percent of the total
section 1983 cases filed in 1971. Of these cases, 14 were actually con-
sidered by the court of appeals with an opinion issuing. The district
court was affirmed in 50 percent of these 14 cases and reversed in
36.8 percent, with the reversal rate for the total sample of 218 being
2.2 percent.104 The reversal rate does indicate that the district courts
had left a considerable amount of their section 1983 business unfin-
ished. For example, Judge Hoffman was reversed in three of the five
cases remanded to the district court in 1971, or 10 percent of the sec-
tion 1983 cases before him. All of these cases were initially dismissed
on the basis of the complaint alone. On remand, Judge Hoffman al-
lowed one brutality case to proceed through the discovery stage and
even issued a contempt citation to the defendants for failure to file a
prompt answer.
One of the most noticeable developments in the 1973 sample in-
volves the marked decline in the number of appeals pursued in the
Seventh Circuit. The primary reason for this trend is probably the
more serious consideration given to the 1973 cases in the district
courts. In the 1973 sample, 14.4 percent of the prisoners applied to
the district court for permission to appeal in forma pauperis, com-
pared to 18.3 percent in 1971 °105 Judges showed a much greater will-
ingness to grant such permission in 1973 and only two petitioners out of
the 12 who were denied leave pursued the matter further in the court
of appeals. In fact, of the 14 prisoners who were granted leave to ap-
peal in 1973 by either the district court or the Seventh Circuit, only
six continued to actively pursue their cases to a decision. This dramat-
ically contrasts with the 1971 sample where nine of 14 cases on appeal
resulted in a hearing or an opinion. Not one of the four cases before
the Seventh Circuit in 1973 was reversed.106
JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Although the prisoners failed to win the relief requested in virtually
all of the non-pending cases studied, the amount of attention devoted
to each case, and presumably the theoretical chances of success, vary
greatly according to the individual judge. Studies in another jurisdic-
tion indicate that the attitudes of individual judges toward prisoner
104. Id.
105. Table 9 infra.
106. Table 10 infra.
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complaints can be the most significant determinant of the qualitative
treatment given them." 7 An examination of the section 1983 cases
studied shows the variation among judges in the number of pleadings
required and in the number of days taken to reach a decision and in-
dicates that considerable discretion is exercised by district judges in
this jurisdiction.l0
Of the 16 judges appearing in the sample, ten required more than
the complaint alone as a basis for decision in all of the section 1983
cases before them in at least one of the two years. Most of the others
decided only about 20 percent of their section 1983 cases on the com-
plaint alone. But four of the judges, Decker, Hoffman, Parsons and
Perry, dismissed 56.9 percent of the 1971 cases they handled on the
basis of the complaint alone. While responsive pleadings were re-
quired in 63.3 percent of all the 1971 cases and 86.1 percent of all the
1973 cases, these four judges required responsive pleading from the
state in only 43.1 percent of their 1971 section 1983 cases. These
same four judges averaged considerably fewer days between filing
and final disposition than the rest of their brothers.
One of the surprising developments in the 1973 sample involves
the more careful consideration given to section 1983 cases by Judges
Decker and Perry, neither of whom dismissed a case on the basis of the
complaint alone in 1973. Both judges spent considerably more time in
ruling on the section 1983 cases before them and decided an average
number of cases on the merits. In fact, several of the pending cases in
the 1973 sample are before Judge Decker.1°9 However, Judges Hoff-
man and Parsons continued to dispose of many cases before them on
the complaint alone and decided all of their cases in far fewer court
days than the average for either sample.
In contrast, many of the judges studied evidenced a willingness to
conscientiously carry out the day-to-day burdens imposed by the ap-
plication of section 19,83 to prison conditions cases. Although these
judges did not grant the relief requested with any greater frequency,
they did give more careful attention to the facts of each case. Respon-
sive pleadings were filed in 63.3 percent of their 1971 cases and 86.1
percent in 1973. Most judges retained jurisdiction until all the facts
were at their disposal for a ruling.
107. See, e.g., Note, The Burden of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions from State Pris-
oners, 52 VA. L. REv. 486, 493 (1966).
108. Tables 7 and 8 infra.
109. Little v. Twomey, Civil No. 73 C 371 (N.D. Il1. 1973) (mail-communication);
Henderson v. Elrod, Civil No. 73 C 2932 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (alleged beating); Whitley
v. Twomey, Civil No. 73 C 1453 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (due process).
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In particular, Judges Marovitz, Bauer, Tone, Marshall, McMillen
Will and McGarr decided each of their cases with careful memorandum
opinions. These judges also spend considerably more days reaching a
decision on the merits than the average. The statistics indicate that
any prison section 1983 claims assigned to one of these judges is likely
to receive all the consideration to which it is entitled under the fed-
eral rules and applicable case law.
CONCLUSIONS
Our study of prisoner petitions filed in the Northern District of Illi-
nois during the years 1971 and 1973 shows an area of the law that is
in a period of marked change.
Although many cases from the 1973 sample are still pending, it ap-
pears at this point that section 1983 avails the usual prison litigant lit-
tle hope of concrete relief in the district courts. Only cases involving
serious allegations of physical brutality or deprivation of first amend-
ment mail-communication rights consistently received full adversary
hearings. The principle benefit derived from most prison section 1983
cases is merely conjectural, namely that the threat of federal interven-
tion has a cautionary effect on state prison officials. For whatever it is
worth, the statute also provides the inmate with the satisfaction of
knowing he is not totally at the mercy of his captors.
The whole future of section 1983 as a fully supplementary remedy
in the prison context remains clouded at this point. Only time will tell
how far the federal courts are willing to go in the prison context to im-
plement the visionary language of Judge Murrah in Stapleton v.
Mitchell: 0
[Wihere the Federal courts sit, human rights under the Federal
Constitution are always a proper subject for adjudication and
... . (there is no) right to decline the exercise of that jurisdiction
simply because the rights asserted may be adjudicated in some
other forum.' 1 '
110. 60 F. Supp. 51 (D. Kan. 1945).
111. Id.at 51.
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APPENDIX A: TABLES
Table 1: TOTAL SECTION 1983 AND HABEAS CORPUS ACTIONS
FILED BY STATE PRISONERS-N.D. ILL. (1967-1973)
YEAR SECTION 1983 HABEAS CORPUS
1967 126 194
1968 132 175
1969 143 245
1970 201 210
1971 218 170
1972 187 139
1973 192 117
% CHANGE
1967-1973
+52.3% -39.6%
Table 2: SUBJECT MATTER OF SECTION 1983 ACTIONS-
1971 (N=193) 1973 (N=173)
1971 1973
Average Average
Number % of 193 Days Number % of 173 Days
Non-Prison (trial & appeal
in state court)
Parole
Prison Conditions:
Medical care
Impure food
Inmate Commissary
Sleep on floor
Filthy Environment
Brutality by guards
Harassment by guards
Brutality by inmates
Inadequate protection
Degrading nudity
Personal sanitation
Exercise
Fresh Air
Denial of rehabilitation
Threats by administration
Inmate Library
Religion
Visitation
Punitive Medication
Total conditions cases
Total conditions issues
Due Process:
Segregation w/o
B-House Lockup-SPU
Classification
Psychiatric
Good time
Innocence
Hearing
32.6 71.1
9.8 80.6
2.0 401.7
9.8 156.8
6.7 85.6
2.5 36.8
2.5 160.2
6.2 299.0
4.1 260.1
4.1 209.1
3.1 205.1
2.5 411.0
2.5 86.2
10.3 215.2
5.1 202.3
5.6 71.1
7.7 260.6
1.0 798.0
2.5 209.0
3.0 64.4
1.5 44.3
1.0 298.5
38.8 137.8
201.6
11.9 228.4
19.6 199.4
9.3 233.7
5.6 196.8
6.7 319.0
7.7 46.7
15.0 238.8
28.9 136.3
2.3 92.0
11.5 222.6
17.3 161.4
6.3 203.1
1.7 367.5
1.7 204.6
6.3 128.5
11.5 352.6
7.5 214.1
6.3 88.3
6.9 109.9
3.4 274.0
8.8 176.4
5.7 155.8
2.3 197.4
4.0 201.8
1.7 218.3
5.7 172.6
4.6 137.8
2.8 194.4
44.5 211.2
203.6
4.0 318.2
20.2 250.9
4.6 182.0
6.3 150.4
7.5 232.4
7.5 209.4
550
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Notice
Witnesses
Confront and Cross
Record
Explanation
CounselBad Faith bv guards
8.8 315.2
3.1 247.1
3.1 263.1
2.0 404.5
2.0 51.7
6.2 248.3
2.5 110.8
Prisoner's Cases
8 4.6 286.2
4 2.3 277.5
6 3.4 279.1
2 1.1 480.0
5 2.8 236.1
9 5.2 382.4
8 4.6 247.9
Total Due Process cases 62 32.1 146.0 57 32.9 228.1
Total Due Process issues 201 222.7 129 252.4
Racial Discrimination: 15 7.7 160.1 10 5.7 238.7
Sentence Adjustment: 7 3.6 47.7 - - -
Depriv. of Property: 6 3.1 164.5 18 10.4 273.3
Mail-Communication: 16 8.2 162.6
General mail 21 12.1 244.1
Access to court 19 9.3 214.4 20 11.5 160.8
Public officials 1 .5 21.0 2 1.1 71.5
Reform groups-Newspapers 3 1.5 356.6 5 2.8 489.2
Legal Materials 6 3.1 449.0 6 3.4 213.1
Mail to lawyers 7 3.6 220.2 10 5.7 300.4
Total Mail-Comm. cases 28 14.5 211.0 39 22.5 245.8
Total Mail-Comm. issues 52 230.8 64 237.7
Total-All Cases 104.6 173
Table 3: 1971-CHARACTERISTICS OF ACTIONS ON PLEADINGS
Category Total Cases (218) Juris. Denied (196) Juris. Granted (22)
N %N '% N
Hearing Held 7 3.2
Ct. Jurisdiction 22 10.0
Discovery 10 4.5
Depositions Taken 9 4.1
Judicial Relief Granted 4 1.7
Injunction or TRO 1 .4
Relief by Consent 5 2.2
Pending 1 .4
Mtn. Dismiss Filed 138 63.3
Granted (84.0) 116 53.2
Denied (16.0) 22 10.0
Mtn. Appt. Counsel 52 23.8
Granted (26.9) 14 6.4
Denied (73.1) 38 17.4
Total Rep. By Counsel 26 11.9
Money Damages Sought 86 39.4
Granted ( 1.1) 1 .4
Denied (98.9) 85 38.9
Dismissed On Merits 47* 21.5*
Dismissed W/O Juris. 196 89.9
Failure State Claim 123 56.4
Failure Exhaust 10 4.5
Mootness 13 5.9
Improper Venue 6 2.7
Gen. Alleg. 3 1.3
Improper Form 6 2.7
Withdrawn 9 4.1
DWP 2 .9
116 59.1
116 (100.0)
43 21.9
8 (18.6)
35 (8.4)
13 6.6
66 33.6
66 (100.0)
43* 21.9"
119 60.7
9 4.5
11 5.6
6 3.0
3 1.5
6 3.0
6 3.0
8 36.3
22 -
10 45.4
9 40.9
4 18.1
1 4.5
5 22.7
1 4.5
22 100.0
22 (100.0)
9 40.9
6 (66.6)
3 (33.3)
13 59.0
20 90.9
1 (5.0)
19 (95.0)
4 18.1
4 18.1
1 4.5
2 9.0
3 13.6
2 9.0
*dismissed on the merits, but most given summary treatment similar to that in cases
dismissed for failure to state a claim.
- 179.7
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Table 4: 1973-CHARACTERISTICS OF ACTIONS ON PLEADINGS
Category Total Cases (173) Juris. Denied (137) Juris. Granted (36)
N % N % N %
Hearing Held 22 12.7
Ct. Jurisdiction 36 20.8
Discovery 11 6.3
Depositions Taken 7 4.0
Judicial Relief Granted 2 1.1
Injunction or TRO - -
Relief by Consent 1 .5
Pending 17 9.8
Mtn. Dismiss Filed 149 86.1
Granted (73.1%) 109 63.0
Denied (23.4%) 35 20.2
Mtn. Appt. Counsel 45 26.0
Granted (22.2%) 10 5.7
Denied (77.8%) 35 20.2
Total Rep. By Counsel 25 14.4
Money Damages Sought 90 52.0
Granted ( 1.1%) 1 .5
Denied (98.9%) 89 51.5
Dismissed On Merits 8 4.6
Dismissed W/O Juris. 137 79.2
Failure State Claim 104 60.1
Failure Exhaust 10 5.7
Mootness 16 9.2
Improper Venue 4 2.3
Gen. Alleg. 5 2.8
Improper Form 6 3.4
Withdrawn 8 4.6
DWP 3 1.7
Res Judicata 1 .5
1 .7
113 82.4
108 (95.5%)
36 26.2
2 (5.5%)
34 (94.5%)
2 1.4
62 45.2
62 (100.0%)
3 2.1
137 -
103 75.1
10 7.2
10 7.2
4 2.9
5 3.6
6 4.3
2 1.4
1 .7
1 .7
552
61.1
30.5
19.4
5.5
2.7
44.4
100.0
(2.7%)
(97.3%)
25.0
(88.8%)
(11.2%)
63.8
77.7
(3.5%)
(96.5%)
13.8
2.7
16.6
16.6
5.5
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